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BRIGADIER MARTIN MOORE:

Well, good morning again, ladies and gentlemen. Martin Moore, Head of Log Strategy. I work for Admiral Andy down at Abbey Wood, and welcome to this LOGNET conference, which, to me as a logistician of some 20 odd years now, I think this year is a seminal moment for Defence, as you've heard, because it heralds the launch of a or establishment of a three star, sort of, owner, functional owner for Support and Defence that's supported by a number of two star reports, all there to cohere and establish that, that really crucial function which is, a support pillar within Defence. Of course, it comes at a time, notwithstanding current events, with what's going what's really affecting the government, but also you'll be alive to the fact, Admiral Andy referred to it earlier on with the integrated review, which, my sense is trying…. the first time really is trying to cohere or the government are trying to set and install what it wants to achieve post-Brexit with its foreign policy and therefore then trying to work out the calculus for a Defence strategic direction for the future. And you can second-guess what that might involve. But in time, and the course of events of integrated review, we will get clarity in terms of what the national ambition is, militarily, to meet our national objectives.

Another study that's aligned to the integrated review is the Defence Security and Industrial Strategy or DSIS as it's termed, led by the Innovation Unit on the third floor of MOD, which some of you may be alive to. In outline, it seeks to strengthen the resilience and competitiveness of vital parts of UK industry that remain important to both our national security and prosperity as a nation. I think that's quite clear. Now, I'm not going to talk about that. But in terms of what I'm going to brief today, it's very much aligned to some of the work that's provided input to DSIS.

So you've heard from Admiral Andy this morning, also from General Hutch, the key one of the key words being used is "mobilisation," and I don't mean mobilisation in terms of putting the country on war footing to support a total war-type scenario, I offer a definition from Steve Glass when we first looked at this conundrum which effectively is saying that we need to start looking at, seriously looking at, what our future demand will be in terms of taking the high-end – I'm not saying 'worst case scenario – the high-end in terms of scaling-up to meet our national ambitions, and therefore really being serious about working out how we need to change our approach, methodologies, et cetera, for industry to be able to step up and support what's required. I know a lot of it's been wrapped up so far in what the previous two stars have spoken about, the Agile Stance Campaign Plan, looking at strategic bases of capability is absolutely key to this. But we can't talk seriously about mobilisation really, unless we really do bring industry into the tent and I think that's my key takeaway for today. That's important because if we are going to be able to support Joint Force 25 and modernise force by 2025 against the ambitions that's going to be setting an integrated review, then I think we need to really develop a strategy, a stand-alone strategy which compliments what General Richard will say this afternoon in his Support strategy and indeed the integrated review, that really does bring industry closer aligned to what we want to do to meet our national objectives.

So, what I'm going to do very quickly today, and I'm as I was going through what's in two stars, I was scrubbing up all my brief because they've eaten most of my sandwiches or partly. Which is great, and of course I was changing reference to CDLS from past tense to future tense, because he obviously hasn't spoken yet, so I'll be careful not to try to second-guess what General Richard might say this afternoon. But what I'm going to try and do is cover three things, and the first two I'll cover very briefly and it's in the classic ends, ways and means. I won't go into the first two in any detail because they've been pretty much touched upon already, but I will come at the end to look at the means. I think the latter question there is really only helped by engagement with industry and we've started that in January with some industry workshops, a number of you attended for whom I'm very grateful, with some focus groups with the Defence Equipment and Support staff and also some one-to-ones. It's given an understanding of, really what this really means in terms of the means, the resources, the approaches, the methodologies to try and change how we need to do our business, to mobilise industry against the ends, which I'll touch on very briefly.

So, starting - I think I'm locked. Next slide, please? There we go. In terms of the ends, it's no surprise to you that in a pro-Brexit environment I think the integrated review, and this is now my second guess because of course today we're still working against SDSR 15 assumptions, and that's how we should carry out our business until given orders otherwise. But global Britain is going to be, obviously, a key feature of the integrated review, and my sense is that what will continue is the national appetite to field and mobilise a Joint Force 2025 in 2025 and underpin by the NATO Response Initiative and our commitment from the recent NATO Summit which talks about the 30-30-30-30, you know, 30 combat units from the three domains of maritime, land and air, to do that in 30 days, and, again, to quote Admiral Andy and General Hutch, "It's speed irrelevance." And speed irrelevance in a European footprint with our NATO allies, particularly the US, is absolutely paramount, and therefore you can see straight away if that becomes absolutely emboldened within the integrated review or SDSR 20, then it's going to change a lot of assumptions and a lot of those assumptions in terms of the triggers, preparedness, readiness of our own forces, but also the preparedness and readiness of industry to support that: supply chains, contractors, et cetera, et cetera. Or does it mean we need to buy out that risk with greater investment in military capability?

The second bit is, and again I won't go into detail because Admiral Andy has given this, is really for you to understand the ways in which we're going to operate in the future and this blurring between, you know, the peace and war as CDS talks about, but, more importantly, that, you know, what we're doing today effectively is working in the sub-threshold space. You know, we look at SDSR 15, which quite cleverly categorises our national ambition into a, sort of, primary and secondary [concurrency step? 00:29:20] and, and what we're doing today, those 35 operations globally, mostly steady state, mostly not putting a huge strain on the industry's capacity to keep up with the demand, but that is very much in the, sort of, contain, protect and engage space, which is what we're doing today: supporting forces in Estonia, for example, in the, sort of, engagement and contain type operation, or supporting forces in Sudan, a very steady state in that sub-threshold environment. But when we have to step up to fight and cross that threshold into threshold, there is obviously a change in terms of dynamic with requirement for agility and to support at pace and scale, and I think that's the conundrum in terms of getting an industrial mobilisation absolutely right.

The next slide, please? So, I'm really now going into the final part of my brief, and I'm going to really cut it down into four segments and it's not really earth-shattering, this very much represents a very early analysis in terms of what we've been doing engaging with industry as I've mentioned previously. They're the four areas that so far in the foothills of developing an emergent strategy for industry mobilisation, and I should say defence and industry mobilisation because it should be a partnership, but for defence and industry mobilisation. It's the four areas which I think they've picked up so far, which we want to take forward into a proper strategy, like I said, that's aligned to the integrated review and, importantly, to General Richard's support strategy.

Before I go to those in particular, the first one I think, Supply Chain Resilience, Admiral Andy's already spoken about. This is quite crucial and I think this is really an area for further analysis because I think it's we don't know what we don't know, or a lot of the knowns and unknowns in terms of globally and our alliance and the, sort of, global footprint. And I take you to, a US example. We're looking at our US counterparts. They've been analysing some… or have done an in depth study into their industry base, across the whole of industry space, not just like supply chains, but across all of the industry space in terms of skill sets, infrastructure, their supply chain reliance globally, and also what capabilities they currently outsource to other global competitors and some potential adversaries. In their analysis, under this Executive Order 13806, as you can see here they've identified in that first [inaudible 00:31:43] the five main causes. The five main causes here you see of what affects their industrial base. Then listed below those are those key factors that disrupt or a specific product or service, and you can see there, one of the key themes there is that "foreign dependency" and also their reliance on global supply chains like we do, and I would argue perhaps ours is probably more stark in terms of our reliance globally on supply chains. Most importantly on their "recommendations", you can see here the key observations and recommendations and of their recommendations it's the surprising level of dependence globally. Now, you could argue that there's a lot of political drive on this because EO 13806 was commissioned in, in September of 2017 when a new president was firmly established, and we know the president has his own political imperatives about what he wants to try and achieve economically. But of course, I think there's lessons we can probably learn from the US experience in terms of our experience of trying to mobilise industry.

So, I think what this says to us on supply chain resilience is for us is what do we want to outsource globally? What is it, and where do you want to rely on global outsourcing? And that big question is do we continue to outsource or do we keep logistics in-house? I know it's a very basic question because it comes down to cost, performance and assurance. But what's vexing business today are those three primary challenges, and I think they're pertinent to Defence today, that triumvirate of challenge of the complexity of working with multiple suppliers globally, the threats of, as Admiral Andy said earlier, in the cyber space, and thirdly, is that incompatibility of the information services out of our control. I think it, sort of, begs the question to us in terms of what, what is it as we move forward and understand our reliance on global supply chains and, and COVID-19 has, I think, taught us some lessons, not least because General Hutch can't get his service dress, but I think it is really bringing us home some real stark lessons in understanding below the third and fourth tiers of our supply chains where that risk is. If we do have to step up to meet the demand of a Joint Force 25 or a NATO Response Initiative, then you can see already the conundrum of understanding where our risks lie, and that's global supply chain.

Moving on, I think the second point to mention is the second recommendation is trying to get defence and industry to move, and this has come from industry, try to move towards a capability engagement-type model. And I think we already - and I used the two examples there of the carrier-enabled power projection based on the Queen Elizabeth, because it's more than just a ship, it's, you know, F35 Bravos to do strike capability, and also to use the Army's strike capability base on Ajax. Because I think what this shows is whilst we in defence have our own risk methodology strategically trying to understand where our strategic risks are, which remain very much close hold because that's what we do in terms of managing our risks at the high level, but I think in terms of each of the equipments that are managed on contracts, what industry tell us is there's an opportunity to for them to come together capability-focused, not platform-focused, to take a greater holistic review on the likely missions and tasks that we have to do and therefore against our own resource prioritisation and planning, how best industry can meet that with the data we give them. With that data it's better they can aid us with better forecasting and also our own sustainability planning. Now, it's a model that's going to have to be operationalised. Clearly, there are firewalls, there's commercial firewalls and other security firewalls which we have to overcome, but this is a model, I think industry have told us so far in engagement that it's one that we can embrace. If we want to talk about upscale and meeting our national ambitions to do things like NRI in 30 days, then we've got to establish a better model in which to inter-operate to have that holistic understanding on forecasting and planning, et cetera, et cetera.

The third and in very similar way, Admiral Andy spoke earlier, is this piece about… is partnerships, and it's probably very easy for me to say this, but what was very clear from our engagement is Defence's ability to move away from a contract-based relationship to a partnership, from a contract-based to a partnership, and, interestingly, looking at some of the more sensitive elements of the EO 13806 report is that the US are very much looking now of establishing greater partnerships for Defence, which I think embraces whole force, not just about people but actually whole force effort, or as Admiral Andy says, "This total support, this future support force concept." I think it's important. You can see there the opportunities there on the slide, and I think what it's what it pivots on is, is this mutual understanding and trust. Again, very easy to say mutual understanding and trust, but I think where we could gain benefit, and industry, is having a way of bringing industry into the tent and having some methodology for integrated planning, and I don't mean tactically what we intend to do when on operations, but strategically, in the strategic base, as part of the strategic base capability work that General Hutch is leading, is to have a model of integrated planning that embraces that capability engagement piece I spoken about; and I think my sense is that it's definitely the step that we have to take forward in Defence if we want industry to mobilise beyond the steady stage sub-threshold to move up to that threshold-type activity.

Finally, I would say that, the whole force by design piece, and this is all embraced by whole force, and what General Richard will talk about this afternoon is we have to move away from this concept of a whole force by accident to a whole force by design. I absolutely buy that, and it doesn't mean by having just outsourcing contracts to Support or contract Support operations because it's cheap and convenient, and actually when it comes to going from sub-threshold to threshold fighting activity, we leave most of our contractors behind because they can't meet that 30-day requirement. There absolutely is a place for whole force but by design not accident, and what I've contained within this is that it's definitely got to be more than people, it's pan capability-based, but we need a mechanism to assure that, we need to assure that whole force piece both the military component and also the industry component and the contractor component, to ensure that we can actually step up and have the agility to meet the scale of doing war fighting if required.

Reassuring summary. I offer you the slide which really does, I think, paint the main thrust of where this emergent strategy is going at the moment. I think, and you'll see in the blue bubble, that when we talk about the ends "to be confirmed in an integratory review," but already we know what our national ambition is today: we've got to be able to do, you know, the secondary concurrency search of a lot of small, niche, global small-scale operations, the 35 we're doing today. But how that changes in the future will probably be under the design of global Britain, and what the Prime Minister's appetite is in his foreign policy, what that means in terms of DSIS and also our strategic objectives. But I suspect that joining Force 25 and, and NATO with the NRI will be front and centre of that, and you can see already that if we are going to be buying into NATO, along with the US, and be able to meet that 30-30-30-30, it does require change in mindset with our ability to mobilise. The ways we spoke about which is the IOPC – the Integrated Operation Concept – which will be complimented in time by General Richard's support operating concept which [Dex? 00:39:55] is writing. That's everything from the, sort of, sub-threshold to threshold. But importantly, on the mean side is those areas I've just covered in the green box, and they're not exhaustive, you know, we will still continue to engage with industry as part of that strat-based capability piece that General Hutch spoke about, because we need to understand what the triggers and drivers are to be able to mobilise and, most importantly, and I don't mean this in a very adversarial sense, we then need a mechanism to be able to assure that capability against those ends in the blue bubble.

So I talk about the four R's of: readiness, resilience, redundancy and responsiveness, and unless we do invest in that mean-square, at the moment, you know, there's a lot of firewalls, it's about contracts, stand-off relationships, and some contractors say they have no idea, even some the planning and the training here led our operations for certain capabilities and therefore how are they expected to stand up and support a major war-fighting activity at scale when they have no access to any data or planning data to be able to meet the demands the defence has made in the future?

So that is really the, the, the, the bones of the emerging strategy and I, I thank you all for your continuing engagement as we take this forward and aligned to the IR timelines and really we're looking at trying to have this as a strategy that's supported by Defence and D & S by, sort of, early summer. Thank you very much for your time. *[Applause]*

[Recording ends]